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Abstract
Public pension systems of the G7 countries were established in an
era when contributors far outnumbered beneficiaries. Now, for each
beneficiary there are fewer contributors, and this trend is projected to
accelerate. To evaluate the prospects for these economies we develop
an endogenous growth overlapping generations model. We analyze
individuals’ behavior when their expectations regarding longevity are
rational or myopic, and examine whether policies exist that can offset
any adverse effects of aging. We find that while perfectly anticipated
aging is welfare improving, myopia worsens welfare, puts pension
systems at risk, and cannot be easily remedied by public policy.
“Population aging is the single most consistent pressure on federal
income security spending, as public pension spending continues its
relentless upward climb.”
Douglas Young, former Canadian Minister
of Human Resources Development
1. Introduction
The public pension systems of the G7 countries were established in an era
when the number of contributors to the pay-as-you-go schemes far outweighed
the number of beneficiaries. Over the post-World War II period the systems
have matured and the populations of the G7 countries have aged as longevity
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has risen and birth rates have fallen. Now, for each beneficiary there are
fewer contributors, and this downward trend is projected to accelerate. To
maintain benefit levels, tax rates and/or productivity growth will have to rise.
Evaluating the future of the systems, individual contributors express grave
doubts that they will receive as they did give (Saito 1998).
To evaluate the prospects for these economies we develop an overlapping
generations model in which individuals face uncertainty over their longevity,
growth is endogenously fueled by individuals’ investments in physical capi-
tal, and individual and government investment in human capital. All retirees
receive public pension benefits, funded in a pay-as-you-go manner. We ana-
lyze individuals’ behavior and social welfare when expectations over length
of life are rational or adaptive (myopic). Using simulations of our model
in which parameter values are drawn from the individual economies of the
G7, we examine for each of the economies and for each of the expectations
assumptions whether policies exist that can offset any adverse effects of ag-
ing. Further, we examine how policies aimed at a specific target group, for
example, the elderly or the young, affect current and future welfare of the
economy as a whole.
Our model is similar in construct to Docquier and Michel (1999) and
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), which also examine the effects of the public
funding of pensions and education on economic growth.1 We, however, as in
Glomm and Kaganovich (2003), take the constraints of the public pension
system (benefits are determined as a replacement rate on wages, so benefits
determine taxes) explicitly into account in our analysis. Thus we assume that
the government, effectively, faces two budget constraints, a public pension
constraint and an education constraint, rather than a unified constraint with
the explicit tradeoff assumed (more for public pensions implies less for edu-
cation). Kaganovich and Zilcha focus on the trade-off between education and
public pension spending absent an aging population. Docquier and Michel
incorporate population growth to model a transitory demographic shock,
whereas we model a demographic transition. Our model differs from these
and other studies, such as Auerbach et al. (1989) and Hviding and Me´rette
(1998), in that we incorporate uncertainty regarding length of life; thus al-
lowing us to determine the importance of expectations regarding longevity.
Our model differs from previous studies of myopia and public pensions in
that we are not attempting to determine the optimal structure of the public
pensions given myopia, as in Feldstein (1985) and Hu (1996). Our work
takes the current systems in the G7 countries as given, examines the effects of
myopia on economic growth and welfare, and looks for policies to ameliorate
those effects, if adverse.
Our findings suggest that perfectly anticipated population aging may be
beneficial to the economy as a whole and does not pose a threat to the solvency
1For a review of the literature relating to public pensions and education, see Kaganovich
and Zilcha (1999).
Aging, Myopia, and PAYGO 451
of the public pension system. Greater longevity induces higher rates of saving
for retirement, whereas declining population growth increases human capital
expenditures per child. These effects offset the negative effects of the higher
tax rate that is necessary to maintain a given stream of public pension benefits.
As a result the growth rate of output per worker rises, and with it, welfare.2
Nonetheless, aggregate saving typically declines resulting in a reduction in
the growth rate of aggregate output.3
When agents are myopic, both social welfare and growth are adversely
affected because taxes rise but the positive longevity effect on saving is absent.
Any policy targeted at retirees, for example, to maintain their standard of
living over their individually unanticipated longer lives, will exacerbate the
problem because taxes to fund such a program will further reduce saving.
Policies directed at the very young, such as higher expenditures on public
education, may generate positive growth effects but will not benefit the initial
generation of retirees, as the effects are felt only with a lag. For such policies
to offset the effects of both myopia and aging, they must be put in place prior
to the onset of aging. Thus, myopia, not aging per se, is the biggest threat to
public pension system viability.
2. The Model
The model developed below is an application of Pecchenino and Pollard
(2002) and is similar to that of Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999).4 There is an
infinitely lived economy composed of finitely lived individuals, firms, and
a government. A new generation is born at the beginning of each period
and lives for at most three periods: youth, working age, and retirement. At
each period t, N (t) identical agents of generation t enter the workforce. The
working-age population grows at the rate n(t).
2.1. Consumers
At date t, agents in the first period of their lives, the young, neither consume
nor produce. They are endowed with one unit of time that they combine in-
elastically with resources provided by their parents, e(t), and the government,
eg (t), to develop their human capital, ht+1(t + 1). Agents in the second period
of their lives, the workers, supply their effective labor, the product of their one
unit of time and their human capital developed in youth, inelastically to firms.
In return, they receive wage income, w(t)ht(t) from which they pay a pension
tax, τ(t), and a school tax, ω(t). They also may receive bequests, B(t), from
2In contrast, Turner et al. (1998) find that aging reduces the growth rate of GNP per capita.
3Most studies of aging focus on aggregate saving and find that aging reduces the saving
rate. See, for example, Auerbach et al. (1989), Hviding and Me´rette (1998), Masson and
Tryon (1990), and Roseveare et al. (1996).
4Derivations for this model follow those for Pecchenino and Pollard (2002). We direct the
reader there for a more detailed discussion of the underlying assumptions, etc.
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their parents, which are tax free. Their disposable income is divided between
funding their children’s human capital development, e(t), their current con-
sumption, ct(t), and saving, s(t), for their consumption when retired, ct(t +
1). Agents in the final period of their lives, the retirees, supply their savings,
s(t − 1), inelastically to firms and consume their public pension benefits,
T(t), and the return to their savings, (1 + ρ(t))s(t − 1). With probability
p(t − 1) an agent who worked during period t − 1 will live throughout the
retirement period, and with probability (1 − p(t − 1)) the agent will die at
the onset of retirement. Agents may form expectations of living into retire-
ment rationally or adaptively (myopically). Rational expectations mean that
working-age agents know their probability of dying at the onset of retirement;
they have perfect foresight. Adaptive expectations means that a working-age
individual assumes that his life expectancy is a convex combination of the ac-
tuarial forecast, p(t), the life expectancy of his parents’ generation, p(t − 1),
and possibly the life expectancy of his grandparents’ generation, p(t − 2).
Let pˆ (t) be the member of generation t’s assessment of life expectancy. If an
agent dies at the onset of retirement, his saving is bequeathed to the members
of generation t, B(t) = [(1 + ρ(t))/(1 + n(t))]s(t − 1).
Personal saving in this model is the equivalent of the sum of the occupa-
tional “second pillar” and the personal “third pillar” of retirement security.
This is because, in the context of this model, a defined-contribution occupa-
tional pension plan will earn the same return as private saving. Thus, as long
as the defined contribution is less than or equal to what agents would choose
to save absent the program, combining these two pillars has no affect on the
behavior of the model.
For tractability, let the preferences of a representative worker at time t be
represented by
Ut = ln c t (t) + pˆ (t) ln c t (t + 1) + δ(1 + n(t + 1)) ln ht+1(t + 1). (1)
Parents get utility from consumption and from educating their children; the
value of this education is summarized by the child’s human capital. This
utility is derived from an altruistic link between parent and child rather than
any personal return they may reap from their investment or other strategic
motive (see Cremer et al. 1992). This inter vivos bequest motive encompasses
the lifetime bequest motive. Since agents do not know when they will die,
additional unintentional bequests may be forthcoming.
Parental and government investments are both essential for human cap-
ital formation. If a parent invests e(t) and the government invests eg (t), then
the child’s human capital will be
ht+1(t + 1) = e t (t)θ1(t)e g (t)θ2(t), (2)
where the parameters θ1(t) and θ2(t) measure the elasticity of parental and
government expenditures on human capital, respectively. This modeling of
educational attainment follows Hanushek’s (1992) achievement function.
Parental, e(t), and governmental expenditures, eg (t), and the efficiency of
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those expenditures, θ1(t) and θ2(t), matter for human capital development.
The utility a parent receives from his dependent children’s human capital is
δ(1 + n(t + 1)) ln ht+1(t + 1); δ is the discount factor.
The representative agent takes as given his human capital, wages, return
on saving, the pension and school tax rates, public pension benefits, bequests,
and government expenditures on education. The agent then chooses saving
and education expenditures to maximize lifetime utility as given by Equation
(1) subject to (2) and the following budget constraints
c t (t) = w(t)ht (t)(1 − τ(t) − ω(t)) − s(t)
− (1 + n(t + 1))e(t) + (1 − p (t − 1))B(t) (3)
c t (t + 1) = (1 + ρ(t + 1))s(t) + T(t + 1), (4)
where constraint (3) encompasses the assumption that bequests are allocated
equally across all members of a generation so that the bequest-dependent
wealth distribution is uniform, as in Hubbard and Judd (1987). This assump-
tion allows us to conduct a representative agent analysis, and restricts uncer-
tainty to the timing of death alone.
The first-order conditions for this problem, with respect to s(t) and e(t),
respectively, are
− 1
c t (t)
+ pˆ (t)(1 + ρ(t + 1))
c t (t + 1) = 0 (5)
and
− 1
c t (t)
+ δθ1
e(t)
= 0. (6)
2.2. Firms
The firms are perfectly competitive profit maximizers that produce output us-
ing the production function Y (t) = A(t)K(t)αH (t)1−α, α ∈ (0, 1). The value
K(t) is the capital stock at t, which depreciates fully in the production pro-
cess. The value H (t) is the effective labor input at t, H (t) = N (t)ht(t), where
N (t) is labor hours. The value A(t)> 0 is a productivity scalar. The production
function can be written in intensive form
y(t) = A(t)ht (t)1−αk(t)α, (7)
where y(t) is output per worker and k(t) is the capital labor ratio.
Firms take the wage, w(t), and rental rate, R(t), as given. They hire ef-
fective labor and capital up to the point where their marginal products equal
their factor prices:
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(1 − α)A(t)ht (t)−αk(t)α = w(t) (8)
αA(t)ht (t)1−αk(t)α−1 = R(t). (9)
2.3. The Government
The government administers the public pension program and funds edu-
cation. It levies proportional income taxes, τ(t) and ω(t), on the workers
to finance pension and education expenditures, respectively. Public pension
benefits are specified as a replacement rate on the wages of current workers.
Thus, T(t) = ξ(t − 1)w(t)ht (t), where T(t) are the transfers to the retired
at date t and ξ(t − 1) is the replacement rate for retirees in period t, which
is set in period t − 1. The tax rate, τ(t), adjusts to ensure that public pension
benefits equal tax revenues
p (t − 1)
1 + n(t) T(t) =
p (t − 1)ξ(t − 1)
1 + n(t) w(t)ht (t) = τ(t)w(t)ht (t). (10)
Solving Equation (10) for τ(t) yields
τ(t) = p (t − 1)ξ(t − 1)
1 + n(t) . (11)
Similarly, total government spending on education must equal total school
tax revenues
e g (t) = ω(t)
1 + n(t + 1)w(t)ht (t). (12)
2.4. The Goods Market
The goods market clears when the demand for goods equals the supply of
goods:
c t (t) + p (t − 1)1 + n(t) c t−1(t) + s(t) + (1 + n(t))e(t) + (1 + n(t))e
g (t)
= w(t)ht (t) + R(t)k(t). (13)
Substituting Equations (3), (4), (8), (9), (11), and (12) into (13), and making
use of the fact that by arbitrage the return on capital must equal the return
on saving,
R(t) = 1 + ρ(t) (14)
yields
s(t − 1) = (1 + n(t))k(t). (15)
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3. Equilibrium
DEFINITION 1: A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of
prices and taxes {w(t), ρ(t), τ(t), ω(t)}∞t = 0, a sequence of allocations
{c t (t), c t (t + 1)}∞t = 0, and a sequence of human and physical capital stocks,
{ht (t), k(t)}∞t = 0, k(0), h0(0) > 0 given, such that given agents’ expectations re-
garding longevity, and given these prices, allocations, and capital stocks, agents’
utility is maximized, firms’ profits are maximized, the government budget con-
straints are satisfied, and markets clear.
Substituting Equations (2)–(4), (8), (9), (11), (12), (14), and (15) into
the first-order conditions given by Equations (5) and (6) results in the follow-
ing set of difference equations in k(t + 1), e(t) and predetermined variables.
pˆ (t)(
1 + n(t + 1) + (1 − α)ξ(t)
α
)
k(t + 1)
− 1

= 0 (16)
and
δθ1
e(t)
− 1

= 0, (17)
where
 = A(t)
[(
1 − p (t − 1)ξ(t − 1)
1 + n(t) − ω(t)
)
(1 − α) + [1 − p (t − 1)]α
]
× e(t − 1)θ1(t−1)(1−α)e g (t − 1)θ2(t−1)(1−α)k(t)α
− [1 + n(t + 1)][e(t) + k(t + 1)].
4. The Analytics of Growth
The following results are for the balanced growth specification of the model.
Similar results hold for the steady-state model specification. All proofs are
available from the authors on request.
PROPOSITION 1: Assume all parameter values are time independent, so x(t) = x
for all t and for all parameters x. Then, economies with higher school taxes, ω,
will have higher growth rates if ωˆ > ω, where ωˆ = θ2[(1 − p ξ/(1 + n))(1 − α)+
(1 − p )α].
The school tax rate, ω, represents the marginal cost of public education
while the marginal benefit to the taxpayer, ωˆ,is the marginal increase in
income during one’s working years, discounted by the marginal efficiency of
the government’s educational input, θ2. If ωˆ > ω, agents receive a positive
income effect from an increase in the school tax rate, leading to increases
in saving and investment in one’s children’s human capital. If ωˆ < ω, both
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saving and human capital investment fall. Thus, as Hanushek and Kim (1995)
suggest, the economic benefits from education are higher the higher is the
quality of the education, here measured by θ2.
If the economy is not on a balanced growth path then increases in the
school tax from a suboptimal level toward a growth-maximizing level can
have growth-increasing effects if the positive human capital effect tomorrow
exceeds the negative physical capital effect today.
The following two propositions examine how economic growth is affected
by changes in the two demographic parameters: expected longevity, pˆ , and the
population growth rate, n. A rise in pˆ affects growth through three channels.
The expectation of a longer life increases saving for retirement (longevity
effect). A longer lifespan reduces bequests (bequest effect) and also increases
the tax rate required to fund public pension benefits (public pension effect),
as shown in Equation (11). The first effect raises the economic growth rate
while the latter two lower it.
A decrease in n also has bequest and public pension effects. A decline in
n results in a rise in bequests received by each worker but raises the pension
tax rate, a shown in Equation (11). A fall in the population growth rate raises
educational expenditures per child (the education effect) and raises saving
per worker (family size effect). All but the public pension effect raise the
growth rate of the economy.
PROPOSITION 2: Economies in which expected longevity, pˆ , is higher have higher
growth rates if the longevity effect dominates the bequest and public pension tax effects.
If agents expect to live longer, then, all else equal (including the age of
retirement), they consume a higher proportion of their saving and leave less
to their children. This negative bequest effect reduces expected income for
working-age agents, reducing saving. Since pension taxes increase as longevity
rises, income while working falls, compounding the negative bequest effect.
The tax effect would be greater if labor supply were elastic, as some agents
would choose to work less in response to the higher taxes. On the other hand
workers expecting a longer lifespan increase their saving. If the longevity
effect is dominant, physical capital accumulation and the equilibrium growth
rate will rise.
When the increase in longevity is unexpected only the negative bequest
and public pension effects remain. For example, suppose at date t agents plan
for the future expecting an unchanged demographic structure. If they live
longer than expected, their saving will be inadequate to fund their longer
life at the anticipated level of consumption. That is, their consumption will
be lower than it would have been had they anticipated a higher probability
of living into old age. Further, the bequests they leave to their children will
be smaller, leaving this next generation with less income. Their children’s
income is further reduced by the rise in public pension taxes as a result of the
increased longevity. Even one generation of unexpectedly long-lived agents
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can have permanent effects on the height of the growth path, if not on the
long-run equilibrium rate of growth.
PROPOSITION 3: Economies with lower population growth rates, n, have higher
growth rates if the sum of the education and family size effects is positive and exceeds
the public pension effect.
With fewer children, education expenditures per child are higher. In
addition, the bequest each of these children receives is higher. There are,
however, two competing income effects. The family size effect is the standard
Solow growth model effect of a lower population growth rate: higher per
capita saving. This positive effect is countered by a negative income effect,
the public pension effect. Public pension taxes are now higher to compensate
for the smaller pool of taxpayers relative to retirees. If the education, bequest,
and family size effects exceed the public pension effect, then economies with
lower population growth rates will have higher equilibrium growth rates.
If the tax effect dominates, a reduced population growth rate may lead to
reductions in economic growth and social welfare, even without the added
complication of longer lived elderly.
5. Simulations: System Sustainability and Social Welfare
In this section, we examine the effects of demographic changes, both antici-
pated and unanticipated, on growth and economic welfare. Social welfare in
period t is
W (t) = ln c t (t) + ν[p (t − 1)/(1 + n(t))] ln c t − 1(t)
+ δ[1 + n(t + 1)] ln ht + 1(t). (18)
Each generation’s consumption at time t is normalized by the size of the
working-age generation at t, N (t). The weight given to the young, δ, is the
same as the weight parents place on educating their children. We assume
that ν > 1; the weight given to the elderly is in excess of their population
weight. This allows for the initial optimality of a public pension program in
an economy that is dynamically efficient.5 That ν exceeds unity implies that
society as a whole puts greater value on the living standards of the elderly
than on the living standards of the young or the middle-aged. That the old
have greater influence than their population size would suggest is explored
by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999). This social valuation could result from
the voting habits and political activity of the elderly. Or, it could be a reflection
of a negative external effect on the welfare of the middle aged and young of
5A public pension system may also be optimal in an economy with generation specific
shocks. Such a system would require the possibility of transfers from workers to retirees
and vice versa (Rangel and Zeckhauser 2001). Since existing systems do not allow for such
transfers, we assume that social welfare considerations prevail.
458 Journal of Public Economic Theory
Table 1: Baseline parameter values
Parameter Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
α 0.32 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.25 0.26
ξ 0.292 0.601 0.520 0.539 0.196 0.175 0.385
ω 0.091 0.080 0.065 0.063 0.053 0.065 0.067
n 0.581 0.241 0.177 0.164 0.260 0.114 0.450
p 0.312 0.318 0.289 0.309 0.290 0.298 0.313
Annual growth
rate of output
per worker
0.0105 0.0177 0.0129 0.0227 0.0287 0.0167 0.0152
low living standards of the elderly. Thus, while the young individually cannot
affect this, society as a whole can. All these provide a rationale for a public
pension system in a dynamically efficient economy.
We begin by calibrating the model to match the recent growth experi-
ences of each of the G7 economies. Each period is a generation, set equal
to 25 years. The weight given by parents to the human capital development
of their children, δ, is 0.98, for all countries, reflecting parental altruism.
The additional weight placed on the elderly’s consumption, ν, is 3.0 (our
results do not depend on the value of this parameter). This assures that the
public pension system is initially optimal in all countries.6 There is no ob-
vious best estimate for θ2, the elasticity of governmental expenditures on
education. We initially assume θ2 = 0.8, high efficiency of governmental ex-
penditures, but also consider θ2 = 0.1, low efficiency of governmental expen-
ditures. For balanced growth θ1 + θ2 = 1, so our choice of θ2 ties down the
value of θ1.
The initial values for the country specific parameters in the model are
given in Table 1.7 The share of physical capital, α, for each country is from
Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak (2001). The school tax rate, ω, is the 1995 ra-
tio of public expenditures on all levels of education to GDP (OECD 2001),
adjusted for labor’s share in output. The replacement rate, ξ , is the aver-
age public pension benefit as a percent of the average gross wage in 1995
(Chand and Jaeger 1996). France, Germany, and Italy have the most gen-
erous public pension systems with replacement rates above 50%. Japan and
the United Kingdom have the least generous systems with replacement rates
below 20%.
6Because saving, and hence economic growth, is higher in the absence of a pay-as-you-go
public pension system, over time the optimality of such a system is eliminated unless the
weight placed on the elderly is ever increasing.
7The equations for growth are set out in an appendix, available from the authors on request.
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Table 2: Demographic change
Parameter Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Working-Age Population: Growth Rate
n( j) 0.581 0.241 0.177 0.164 0.260 0.114 0.450
n( j + 1) 0.235 0.040 −0.054 −0.040 −0.137 0.098 0.233
n( j + 2) 0.012 −0.077 −0.192 −0.242 −0.242 −0.063 0.131
Longevity
p( j − 1) 0.312 0.318 0.289 0.309 0.290 0.298 0.313
p( j) 0.373 0.376 0.358 0.369 0.428 0.347 0.350
p( j + 1) 0.452 0.459 0.465 0.509 0.519 0.430 0.431
The growth rate of the working-age population, n, is given by the growth
rate of the population aged 20 to 64 years between 1970 and 1995.8 Canada
had the largest percentage increase in the working-age population while the
United Kingdom had the smallest. The ratio of the population of retirees
to workers in 1995 multiplied by the gross growth rate of the working-age
population, (1 + n), gives the value for p.
Using these baseline parameter values and setting the growth rate of
output per worker at its 1970–1995 average rate (Heston et al. 2002), allows
us to determine the value of the constant, A, in the production function.
We then introduce population aging and re-simulate the model, keeping all
other parameters at their initial values.
Aging in our model is the result of two demographic factors: a decline in
n and an increase in p. Specifically, we assume life-expectancy rises beginning
with the generation entering the workforce in period j: p( j) > p( j − 1) and
continues for an additional period: p( j + 1) > p( j). Population growth slows
beginning with the children of generation j: n( j + 1) < n( j) and continues
with the next generation: n( j + 2) < n( j + 1). These changes result in a
reduction in the size of the working-age population relative to the retired
population. The parameters corresponding to this demographic transition,
given in Table 2, are based on the demographic projections for 2020 and 2045.
By the second period, the population growth rate is negative in all countries
except Canada and the United States. To prevent a collapse of the working-
age population in our model, we assume that the working-age population
remains constant following the two-period transition, as does longevity. As the
population ages, the pension tax rate, τ , rises to maintain the replacement
rate as shown in Equation (11).
8Population data and projections for all countries are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
International Database, Tables 004 and 094. Data are based on the July 17, 2003 update.
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5.1. Perfect Foresight
First, assume that agents have perfect foresight: they know the relevant value
of p for their generation: pˆ (t) = p(t). The combined effect of increasing
longevity and declining population growth rates results in a rise in saving
per worker and human capital investment per child. These in turn increase
output per worker as shown in Figure 1.
Increasing p at t = j has a positive effect on saving in period j, a longevity
effect. In addition, generation j’s human capital expenditures per child rise
as n( j + 1) declines, a positive education effect. Both effects boost output
per worker in period j + 1.
In period j + 1, longevity continues to rise and the population growth rate
continues to decline. However, the positive longevity and education effects
are now tempered by the negative bequest and public pension effects of the
rise in p( j) and the fall in n( j + 1). The boost in the growth rate of output
per worker as a result of the change in demographics in the previous period,
in combination with the longevity and education effects, ensure a further rise
in the growth rate of output per worker in period j + 2 in all countries.
In period j + 2, longevity remains unchanged. The population of children
in this period is now the same as the working-age population, n( j + 3) = 0.
For Canada and the United States this is a decline in the population growth
rate but for the other five countries the growth rate of the population rises, as
n( j + 2) was negative. Thus, in the United States and Canada human capital
Figure 1: Growth rate of output: λ1 = 1, θ2 = 0.8, percentage point deviation from baseline
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expenditures per child continue to rise, while in the other five countries the
rise in n( j + 3) has the opposite effect. In all countries the negative bequest
and public pension effects continue. In Canada, the negative effects offset
the education effect and the per worker growth rate falls slightly. Only in the
United States does the growth rate in period j + 3 rise.
In period j + 3, there is a negative public pension effect in Canada and
the United States as a result of the decline in n( j + 3), but a positive effect
in the other five countries. Thus, the per worker growth rate of output falls
slightly in period j + 4 in the former two countries and rises in the other five.
At this point the demographic transition is complete and the growth rate of
output per worker is at its new, higher equilibrium.
A declining population growth rate will reduce the growth rate of aggre-
gate output unless it is offset by a rise in the growth rate of output per worker.
Only in Japan and the United Kingdom, is the rise in output per worker suffi-
cient enough to produce a slight rise in the long-run growth rate of aggregate
output, as illustrated in Figure 1. In these two countries, greater longevity, in
combination with a low replacement rate, ξ , causes a rapid rise in saving to
fund retirement, driving the rise in the growth rate of aggregate output.
The importance of the efficiency of government expenditures on educa-
tion is illustrated by Figure 2, which shows the results of simulating the model
assuming that θ2 = 0.1 for all countries. Lowering the estimate of θ2 results in
a smaller rise in the growth rate of output per worker. In Germany and Italy,
Figure 2: Growth rate of output: λ1 = 1, θ2 = 0.1, percentage point deviation from baseline
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output per worker falls relative to the baseline during part of the transition.
The lower θ2 produces a decline in aggregate output in all countries.
The demographic changes affect welfare through their effects on the
weight given to each generation and on consumption. The increase in
longevity raises the weight placed on the consumption of the retired gen-
eration and has a positive effect on welfare, as can be seen in Equation (18).
The decline in the growth rate of the working-age population, first reduces
the weight placed on human capital expenditures on children (a negative ef-
fect on welfare); eventually it also increases the weight placed on retirees, thus
having an ambiguous effect on welfare. The positive effect of aging on the
growth rate of output per worker increases consumption and has a positive
effect on welfare. In the long run the positive effects dominate and welfare
rises regardless of the choice of θ2, as shown in Figure 3.
In all countries, except the United Kingdom, the initial (period j) neg-
ative effect of an increase in aging on welfare primarily results from the
decrease in the population growth rate n( j + 1). Specifically, the middle-
aged increase their consumption as the lower population growth rate reduces
parental expenditures on children, although expenditures per child rise. The
human capital of each child, hj+1( j), rises, but the weight given to this gen-
eration in the welfare function falls as n( j + 1) decreases. The increase in
consumption by the middle-aged is not large enough to offset this negative ef-
fect, and welfare in period t = j falls. Over time, the increase in the growth rate
Figure 3: Welfare—perfect foresight, deviation from baseline
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Table 3: Expenditures on public pensions as a percent of output
Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
Predemographic transition 3.9 11.4 8.8 10.2 3.1 3.5 6.2
Postdemographic transition 9.0 20.4 16.8 19.5 6.9 5.6 12.3
of output per worker, resulting from increased physical and human capital
per worker, raises consumption and welfare for all generations.
The decline in n( j + 1) is smallest in the United Kingdom. In this country
the effect of the rise in p( j) predominates. The low replacement rate induces a
sharp rise in saving given a rise in expected longevity. In period j, consumption
of the working-age population declines, as do parental expenditures per child.
Human capital per child rises as an increase in government expenditures per
child offsets the decline in parental expenditures. Nevertheless, the decline
in the weight given to the young in the welfare function and the decline in
the consumption of workers result in a small drop in welfare.
Perfectly anticipated aging raises output per worker and the welfare of
future generations. Yet, an aging population results in substantial increases in
public pension expenditures. Table 3 shows the share of pension expenditures
in output prior to and following the demographic transition. These increases
are similar to those estimated by Chand and Jaeger (1996) and Roseveare
et al. (1996).
In our model, the systems remain economically viable, that is, contribu-
tions cover expenditures. This result may be affected by our assumption that
labor supply is inelastic. If labor force participation rates are sensitive to the
tax rate, τ , then as the economy ages labor force participation rates fall as
workers move, for example, into the informal sector. Under these circum-
stances, the systems in some countries may become insolvent.
5.2. Adaptive (Myopic) Expectations
We next conduct a number of simulations under alternative assumptions
on individuals’ expectations of their longevity and compare these with the
perfect foresight results. To do so we assume that a working-age agent assumes
his life expectancy is a convex combination of the actuarial forecast, p(t), the
life expectancy of his parents’ generation, p(t − 1), and, possibly, the life
expectancy of his grandparents’ generation, p(t − 2).9 Thus, define
pˆ (t) = λ1p (t) + λ2p (t − 1) + λ3p (t − 3), (19)
where λ1, λ2, λ3 ≤ 1 and λ3 = 1 − λ1 − λ2.
We present results for three possible combinations of the λs. The first
specification is λ1 = λ2 = 0.5: individuals place equal weight on the actuarial
9This simple formulation incorporates both myopia and learning.
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forecast and the experience of their parents’ generation in assessing their
own life expectancy. The second specification is λ2 = 1. Individuals assess
their probability of living into retirement as equivalent to that of their par-
ents’ generation. The third specification is λ3 = 1. Individuals assess their
probability of living into retirement as equivalent to that of their grandpar-
ents’ generation. In all specifications, upon reaching retirement age, the true
p is revealed.
Myopia is harmful to economic growth, either on a per worker or ag-
gregate basis. This is because as longevity increases and this increase is not
taken into account, agents do not save adequately for their, unanticipated,
longer lives.10 In the terminology of Proposition 2, the longevity effect disap-
pears and only the negative income and bequest effects remain.11 Because,
in our model, p stabilizes after two periods, a myopic economy’s growth rate
converges to the perfect foresight long-run equilibrium value.
Welfare in the initial period, t = j, is higher under myopia than under
perfect foresight, regardless of the efficiency of government expenditures on
education. Figure 4 illustrates the results for θ2 = 0.8. The failure of workers to
recognize an increase in longevity results in a shift in the allocation of income
away from saving and toward current expenditures, relative to perfect fore-
sight. Parental expenditures on children, as well as own consumption, rise.
Since the initial generation of retirees is unaffected, welfare unambiguously
rises. Although the rise in education expenditures in period j has a beneficial
effect on output in the next period, it cannot offset the negative effect of
the decline in saving. The fall in output in j + 1 and lower bequests relative
to perfect foresight results in a decline in the working-age population’s own
consumption expenditures, and their expenditures on education. Also, the
retired generation now reduces its consumption relative to the baseline due
to the lack of adequate saving. Welfare falls and continues to fall, as shown
in Figure 4, until the demographic transition is fully incorporated into in-
dividuals’ saving behavior. Thereafter, the difference between welfare under
myopia and perfect foresight narrows. The lower saving of the myopic gener-
ations leads to permanent decline in welfare relative to perfect foresight. The
greater the degree of myopia, the greater is the loss in welfare. The extent
to which myopia results in a reduction in welfare varies across countries. The
greatest reduction in welfare occurs in Germany and the smallest reduction
in the United States.
Myopia is often given as a reason for the existence of public pension
systems. Yet, Feldstein (1985) showed that even if everyone in the economy
is myopic, it still may be optimal to have no public pension system. A similar
10In our model, myopic individuals save for retirement, but their savings are inadequate
given the increase in p. This is different from Feldstein (1985) and Hu (1996) in which
myopic agents save nothing for retirement.
11These results would be the same if agents had rational expectations, but the longevity
projections upon which they based their savings decisions proved to be too low.
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Figure 4: Welfare: θ2 = 0.8, deviation from perfect foresight
result follows from our model. As Figure 5 shows, the long-run deviation of
welfare under myopia from perfect foresight is greater with a public pension
system than without one. In addition, the short-run gain from myopia is higher
in the absence of a public pension system. The decrease in saving of the
myopic generations relative to perfect foresight is higher in the presence of a
public pension system, while the increase in expenditures on one’s children is
lower. Both effects produce a lower growth rate, relative to perfect foresight,
in an economy with a public pension system.
Japan is the country in our study that has already experienced substantial
aging as a result of both a sharp drop in the growth rate of the working-
age population and a rise in longevity. The growth rate of aggregate output
in Japan has fallen when comparing the periods 1950–1975 and 1975–2000.
This decline is consistent with either myopia or a low θ2. The growth rate of
output per worker has also fallen in Japan, in contrast to the prediction of
our model. This difference could be explained by the effect on growth of the
rebuilding of the capital stock in the early postwar period.
5.3. School Taxes
Faced with a myopic population, is there any means available to a govern-
ment to effect higher rates of saving? In our model, any forced saving plan,
such as government-imposed mandatory pensions, would have the effect of
reducing an individual’s saving one-to-one (or more than one-to-one if the
return on government pensions exceeds the return on an individual’s own
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Figure 5: Welfare, deviation from perfect foresight, λ3=1, θ2=0.8
saving). Thus, to achieve an increase in saving, government mandates would
have to cause individuals to save in excess of their desired amount. While this
may make them better off in an ex post sense, it will not make them better off
ex ante.
Evidence from the Australian superannuation funds (the privatized por-
tion of its pension system) provides support for the argument that govern-
ments are unable to force an increase in saving. In the first 5 years after
contributions to the system became mandatory, the $110 billion in accumu-
lated assets were mostly offset by borrowings (The Economist, 1998).
If the government increases the school tax prior to the onset of aging,
individuals are forced to save, in terms of their children’s human capital, but
do not view paying the tax as forced saving. This tax increase may generate
improvements in growth and social welfare.12 The value of θ2 is crucial to
these results. When ω is increased, income of the working-age population
initially falls and so agents reduce their saving and their expenditures on
human capital. If the efficiency of government expenditures on education is
sufficiently high, then human capital and hence output will rise. Moreover,
this rise in human capital expenditures will more than offset the decline in
consumption of the working-age population, resulting from the higher tax,
and hence welfare will rise. As Proposition 1 indicates, the lower is θ2 the
12If the rational expectations longevity projections proved too low, no such policy would
be possible.
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lower is the optimal ω. When θ2 = 0.8 all countries benefit from an increase
in the school tax rate. When θ2 = 0.1 the optimal school tax rate is below
the initial tax rate in Canada even prior to the demographic transition. Any
increase in the tax rate lowers welfare. In France and Italy, welfare declines
as the optimal school tax rate following the demographic transition is below
the new tax rate.
If agents view parental and governmental expenditures on education as
perfect substitutes then any attempt by the government to increase saving by
raising the school tax rate will fail. Parents will reduce their expenditures on
their children in line with the rise in government education expenditures.
5.4. Trust Fund
Another way to handle myopia is through the use of a trust fund. The value of a
trust fund in period t is the difference between revenues and expenditures of
the public pension system and the gross return on any accumulated balances.
The trust fund is equivalent to government savings:
s g (t) = τ(t)w(t)ht (t) − [p (t − 1)ξ(t − 1)/(1 + n(t))]w(t)ht (t)
+ [(1 + ρ(t))/(1 + n(t))]s g (t − 1). (20)
Now τ(t) = [p (t − 1)ξ(t − 1)/(1 + n(t))] + γ (t), where γ (t)is the increase
in the public pension tax rate to support prefunding of benefits. Equation
(20) then can be rewritten as
s g (t) = γ (t)w(t)ht (t) + [(1 + ρ(t))/(1 + n(t))]s g (t − 1). (21)
The capital stock at time t is now a combination of private saving, s(t −
1), and public saving, sg (t − 1). So the goods market clearing Equation (15)
become s(t − 1) = [1 + n(t)]k(t) − sg (t − 1).
The trust fund system can be set up in two ways. The first is to increase
τ(t) (relative to the no action policy) by setting γ (t) > 0 in the periods in
which myopia results in an underestimation of longevity and lower τ in the
next period(s) without changing ξ . For example, when λ2 = 1, τ( j), and
τ( j + 1) rise while τ( j + 2) and possibly τ( j + 3) fall. The increase in τ
reduces private saving both in terms of physical and human capital, as well
as consumption expenditures of the affected working-age generations. The
decline in private saving lowers consumption of the retired generation. All
of these effects result in a reduction in welfare for the duration of the policy.
Nevertheless, the physical capital stock rises, because government saving more
than offsets the decline in private saving. As a result, welfare eventually rises
once the trust fund is exhausted.
The second method is to increase both τ(t) and ξ(t) for the myopic
generations. When λ2 = 1, τ( j) and τ( j + 1) rise resulting in a two-generation
trust fund. The replacement rates, ξ( j) and ξ( j + 1), are chosen so that the
trust fund is exhausted in period j + 1. The increase in the tax rate and the
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rise in the replacement rate lower private saving by more than the increase
in government saving. Total saving declines and future generations are made
worse off. Because of this negative effect on saving, prefunding the public
pension system lowers welfare in all periods.
6. Conclusion
Over a period of several generations, the proportion of retirees relative
to workers is expected to rise as the population growth rate declines and
longevity rises. In the face of this demographic transition, we assume that the
government attempts to maintain the generosity of the public pension system
by fixing the replacement rate at its preaging rate. Given this policy, we exam-
ine the effects of aging on growth and welfare under alternative assumptions
on individuals’ expectations of longevity.
If individuals fully anticipate increased longevity, and hence increase sav-
ing for retirement, then while aging generally reduces the growth rate of
aggregate output, it need not reduce the growth rate of output per worker.
If individuals have perfect foresight and prefer a longer life to a shorter life,
aging does not reduce welfare in the long run. This prognosis is in stark con-
trast to Kotlikoff et al. (2001) and Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1999) who paint
an unremittingly bleak portrait of the future given the demographic transi-
tion. Their results and ours could be reconciled if they were to revise saving
behavior to account for myopia (under-saving given incorrect perception of
longevity) and its correction via learning (perfect foresight) or amelioration
via induced human capital investment (school taxes).
If individuals are myopic, then during the demographic transition the
economic growth falls relative to perfect foresight. With myopic expectations
the growth rate of the economy will, in the long run, match the perfect
foresight growth rate. Welfare receives an initial boost as myopic individu-
als consume more and spend more on their children than the more frugal
agents with perfect foresight. This gain is short-lived. Welfare is lower in all
subsequent periods as a result of the lower savings of the myopic generations.
These results are lower bounds since we have assumed that the supply of labor
will not fall when social security taxes rise. For small changes in taxes this as-
sumption may be reasonable, but this is not the case for the large changes in
taxes forecast for many countries as they try to maintain their public pension
systems in the face of population aging.
Given a myopic population, few policies are available to the government
to offset the adverse growth and welfare effects. However, the government can
raise the growth rate and welfare by inducing saving through human capital
development, that is, raising the school tax rate. Such a policy, however, must
be in place prior to the onset of aging. In addition, the success of such a
policy depends on the efficiency of government expenditures on education. If
government expenditures are not sufficiently productive, then raising school
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taxes will only exacerbate the effects of aging, lowering the output of the
economy (relative to no increase), and hence lowering welfare.
While myopia in our model results from agents’ failure to fully account
for changing demographics, the effects on saving are similar to models in
which consumers fail to adjust to changes in fiscal policies. Poterba (1988),
for example, notes that while the U.S. public pension reforms enacted in
1983 reduced the present value of benefits for young workers, there is little
evidence that these changes have had any effect on saving behavior. These
results indicate that myopia rather than aging is primarily responsible for
reducing growth and welfare when countries maintain their pay-as-you-go
public pension systems as the population ages.
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